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Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia1
Abstract: #e aim of this study is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis that in 
Indonesia one can $nd institutions that characterize two power-sharing models 
which are considered opposites of one another in political theory – centripetalism 
and consociationalism. In consequence, the Indonesian power-sharing system 
should be viewed as a hybrid, or mixed, system, and not a typically centripetal 
system as is usually the case in the literature. At the beginning of this article, 
a short analysis of Indonesia’s political situation is given for the purpose of de-
$ning the factors which determined the introduction of inter-segmental power-
sharing solutions in that country. #is is followed by a description of the speci$c-
ity of consociationalism and centripetalism. #e article goes on to discuss speci$c 
institutions of both power-sharing models which exist in Indonesia and ends with 
some concluding remarks on the thesis advanced at the outset. 
Keywords: Indonesia; hybrid power-sharing; territorial power-sharing; power-shar-
ing; centripetal; consociational
Indonesian society is a plural one, as it is made up of di&erent segments, including 
ethnic groups and religious communities. In societies of this type con*icts of an ethnic, 
religious, and communal nature often mark inter-segmental relations. A number of 
states inhabited by distinct ethnic and religious segments have worked out solutions 
aimed at limiting such con*icts and, consequently, stabilizing their political situation. 
When these solutions take on an extended or even a systemic nature, especially if 
1  #is article was written as part of project No. 2014/15/B/HS5/01174, entitled Centripetalism 
as a Model of Political System for Multi-Ethnic States: Comparative Analysis of Two Cases, $nanced by 
the National Science Centre, Poland. 
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they are associated with a formal, institutionalized inclusion in the governing process 
of politicians representing di&erent segments of a plural society, we are dealing with 
inter-segmental power-sharing (Wilford, 2003). Countries that have implemented 
such a power-sharing system include Indonesia. 
#e aim of this study is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis that in Indonesia 
one can $nd institutions that characterize two power-sharing models that are consid-
ered opposites of one another in political theory – centripetalism and consociational-
ism. As a result, the Indonesian power-sharing system should be viewed as a hybrid, 
or mixed, system, rather than a centripetal system, as it is usually described in the 
popular political literature. 
At the beginning of this article, a short analysis of Indonesia’s political situation 
is given for the purpose of de$ning the factors which determined the introduction 
of the inter-segmental power-sharing solutions in that country. #is is followed by 
a description of the speci$city of consociationalism and centripetalism. #is order is 
determined by the fact that consociationalism is considered to be an older form of 
power-sharing than centripetalism. #e article goes on to discuss speci$c institutions of 
both power-sharing models which exist in Indonesia and ends with some concluding 
remarks on the thesis advanced at the outset. 
Indonesia and its Political Context 
Indonesia, independent since 1945, is the world’s fourth most populous country, 
with a population of about 261 million inhabitants in 2016 (Worldometers, 2016). 
#e Indonesian economy is one of the world’s largest.2 Indonesia occupies an area of 
almost 2 million km2, and its territory on the equatorial axis extends over 5,000 km. 
#e country is made up of about 17,000 islands, over 6,000 of which are inhabited. 
Unique cultures have emerged on many Indonesian islands. Indonesian society is 
very divided ethnically and, to a lesser degree, also religiously. According to data 
from 2010, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia are the Javanese (a little over 40% 
of the entire population), followed by the Sundanese (approx. 15.5%), the Malay 
(approx. 3.7%), the Batak (approx. 3.6%) and the Madurese (approx. 3%) (Ananta 
et al., 2013). #e share of any of the several hundred other native ethnic groups3 in 
Indonesia’s population is under 3%. Among the immigrant population, the most 
2  Indonesia’s nominal GDP in 2015 was approx. 862 billion USD, making the country the 
5th largest economy in Asia and the 16th in the world (World Bank, 2016). 
3  According to Macdonald (2013, p. 4), there are even “over one thousand ethnic and subethnic 
segments” in Indonesia.
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numerous are the Chinese (approx. 1.2%). According to data from 2010, the vast 
majority of Indonesians, approx. 87%, are Muslim (overwhelmingly Sunni); the 
number of Christians, (Protestants and Catholics) is just under 10%; and Hindus 
represent approx. 1.7% (Index Mundi, 2015).4
#e introduction, mostly during the democratization wave in 1998 – 2002, of in-
stitutions which are typical of inter-segmental power-sharing systems was determined 
by three basic factors. First, smaller ethnic groups feared that the Javanese, who were 
politically and economically superior, would vigorously pursue their interests at the 
expense of theirs and the state. As is shown by Donald L. Horowitz (2013, p. 58), 
certain electoral systems could give the inhabitants of Java or the ethnic Javanese, 
a su<cient number of votes to enable them to single-handedly elect the president of 
Indonesia. Smaller ethnic groups’ fear of Javanese dominance was made greater by 
the latter’s preponderant in*uence in Indonesia’s political life during the authoritarian 
period,5 and by the fact that many Javanese migrate from the overpopulated island of 
Java to other islands. Christians, especially those who live in the Maluku Islands, in 
certain areas of Sulawesi, and also in the Indonesian part of New Guinea, are especially 
fearful of dominance by the Javanese, most of whom are Muslim. #e majority of 
Indonesia’s Christians belong to small ethnic groups.
Second, when the democratic changes began in 1998,6 part of Indonesia’s po-
litical elite, mostly Javanese, feared the country’s territorial disintegration and, more 
speci$cally, the secession of certain of its regions, as exempli$ed by East Timor’s 
independence in 2002. Separatist tendencies in independent Indonesia were at one 
time very vivid and, to a lesser degree, continue to persist in the northern portions 
of Sumatra, in the province of Aceh (despite the signing in 2005 of a peace agree-
ment between local separatists and the Indonesian authorities), which abounds in 
deposits of oil and natural gas, and in the Indonesian portion of New Guinea, in 
the provinces of Papua and West Papua, which have various natural resources such 
4  For more on religious divisions in Indonesia, see Macdonald (2013, p. 6 – 7).
5  Horowitz (2013, p. 59) notes that during the presidency of Suharto (who governed unin-
terruptedly from 1967 to 1998), the Javanese not only enjoyed key in*uence on the central 
government but through the intermediary of retired Indonesian army o<cers made up “the core 
of political control” beyond Java, on the so-called external Indonesian islands.
6  #e changes began with the resignation of President Suharto following a wave of popular 
protests in 1998, and with the $rst multi-party elections in 1999.
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as gold, copper, silver, natural gas and wood.7 Both provinces and Aceh were given 
a special autonomous status.8 
In addition, separatist currents were quite strong until recently in multi-ethnic 
Maluku, in the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago, in the present provinces 
of Maluku and North Maluku, where some ethnic groups are Muslim and some 
Christian. On several occasions (1950 – 63, 1999 – 2002), Maluku was the scene of 
bloody con*icts between followers of the two religions who were, at the same time, 
members of various ethnic groups. Aspirations to gain broad autonomy also emerged 
in the east-central part of Sumatra (in the regions of Riau, presently divided into two 
provinces – Riau and the Riau Archipelago), which has various natural resources and is 
inhabited in large measure by Malays, Bataks and Chinese; on the Minahasa Peninsula 
in north-eastern Sulawesi in the multi-ethnic province of North Sulawesi, whose 
population is in large measure Christian; and on the oil-rich island of Borneo, in the 
province of East Kalimantan, to which Indonesians of di&erent ethnic backgrounds 
migrate. #e provinces of Central Kalimantan (once part of East Kalimantan province) 
and West Kalimantan are periodically the scene of con*icts between the native Dayaks 
and Malay, and migrants from the island of Madura, the Madurese.
Horowitz (2013, p. 59) thinks that a third important factor in*uencing the forma-
tion of institutions typical of inter-segmental power-sharing in Indonesia at the turn 
of the 20th to the 21st centuries was the concentration of support for Indonesia’s most 
important political parties at the time in di&erent regions of the country9 – a situation 
which was a threat to political stability.
As the above summary indicates, conditions in Indonesia make it possible for 
separatisms, and of ethnic and communal con*icts to arise. #e largest of them (in 
the Indonesian part of New Guinea and in Aceh) took place prior to the introduction 
of power-sharing. Con*icts of lesser intensity also took place at the beginning of the 
21st century. At present, the intensity of separatist currents in Indonesia is low, and 
ethnic and communal con*icts occur rarely. Presumably, this state of a&airs is caused 
in part by the functioning of institutions typical of inter-segmental power-sharing.
7  #e Indonesian, western portion of New Guinea, where the provinces of Papua and West 
Papua are located, used to be called Irian Barat (West Irian), Irian Jaya, and subsequently Papua. 
8  For more on separatisms and autonomy in Aceh and Indonesian Papua, see McGibbon, 2004. 
9  #is was especially the case for di&erent parts of Java. However, some parties relied on 




Two models of inter-segmental (especially inter-ethnic) power-sharing are distin-
guished and opposed to each other in the abundant literature on the subject:10 conso-
ciationalism and centripetalism (also called “integrative power-sharing”) (Sisk, 1996; 
Horowitz, 2014; Wol&, 2010; Reilly, 2007; Basedau, 2011). #e logic of consociation-
alism is based on the concept of primordialism which, according to Arend Lijphart 
(1995, p. 855), presupposes that ethnicity understood as ethnic identity “is an inher-
ited characteristic and, if not permanently $xed, at least very di<cult to change.” From 
a primordialist perspective, the idea of creating pan-ethnic (or pan-religious) societies 
in multi-segmental (especially multi-ethnic) states seems utopian. #e direct opposite 
of primordialism is instrumentalism. According to this concept, the nature of ethnicity 
is *uid and manipulable (Lijphart, 1995, p. 855) and this carries important political 
consequences. Proponents of the instrumentalist approach think that ethnicity can be 
roused to pursue particular aims but, on the other hand, that its signi$cance can be 
reduced for the purpose of building pan-ethnic societies. #e instrumentalist approach 
seems to be supported by those politicians and constitutionalists in multi-ethnic states 
who see no need to introduce in such states systemic political solutions that re*ect 
existing ethnic divisions. In consequence, they usually opt either for authoritarian 
structures or the institutions of liberal majoritarian democracy. In the middle, between 
primordialism and instrumentalism, lies constructivism.11 Admittedly, its proponents 
are in agreement with the primordialist view that ethnicity is something given or set 
in advance, but they also state that it can then be shaped for the purpose of attaining 
some desirable goal having to do with, for example, the political modernization of 
the state. Constructivist premises serve as a basis for the logic of centripetalism.
10  It is worth mentioning, however, that the so-called ‘complex power sharing’ theory is under 
development (see Wol&, 2012). In short, the theory’s aim – as perceived by Wol& – is to suggest the 
best solutions for inter-segmental accommodation in (deeply) divided societies. Such solutions can 
be borrowed from di&erent power-sharing models as well as other con*ict resolution approaches. 
While it seems to be a normative theory (if partly based on selected empirical examples), in Indo-
nesia a hybrid model of inter-segmental power sharing (centripetal with consociational additions) 
has taken shape. #us, the Indonesian case can tell us about something that is purely empirical. 
On the other hand, the Indonesian case (or the similar Nigerian one, see Trzciński 2016a) is one 
of the empirical examples that might be helpful in the further development of a normative theory. 
11  #e division into primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism is promoted by, for 
example, Lijphart (1995, pp. 855 – 856). Compare the other division proposed by Shapiro (2006, 
pp. 125 – 127). 
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#e theory of consociationalism presupposes that when society in a given state is 
plural in character and, especially, strongly divided ethnically, individual ethnic groups 
should possess their own distinct representation in state government (in the form of 
ethnic parties, for example) and thus to be able to participate in political decision 
making. Such a state entrenches existing ethnic divisions (Lijphart, 1980; 2008). 
Centripetalism presupposes the opposite – the possibility of political integration of 
the groups’ elites above segmental (especially ethnic) divisions, thus weakening the 
importance of the latter. Centripetalism, in contrast to consociationalism, by de$nition 
promotes ethnically neutral legal practices concerning the status of individuals and 
groups in multi-segmental (especially multi-ethnic) conditions – something that is 
supposed to strengthen the process of integration, the reaching of which is the purpose 
of centripetal institutions.
#e nucleus of consociationalism is made up of four institutions (Lijphart, 2008, 
p. 42): grand coalitions (such as, for example, governments formed by segmental (e.g. 
ethnic) parties or governments made up of politicians representing speci$c segments 
of plural society or preferably originating from all of those groups); cultural autonomy 
for individual linguistic groups (if they live in one speci$c area then the autonomy can 
also be of a territorial nature, for example, that of ethnic federalism); proportionality 
in political representation and in the appointment of members of the civil service; 
and a limited veto right for the minorities (taking at times the form of a requirement 
to obtain a quali$ed majority for certain types of changes to the law).12 Among the 
states that have, at least in part, implemented consociationalism at home are Cyprus, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Empirical centripetalism (in Nigeria and Indonesia)13 is made up of the follow-
ing institutional solutions (Reilly, 2007, pp. 83 – 91; 2011a, pp. 291 – 295; 2011b, 
pp. 57 – 64): a  territorial structure within the framework of which large ethnic 
groups are “broken down” so their members live in distinct, preferably multi-ethnic 
territorial and administrative units – something that is supposed make the elites of 
one and the same large group representing various regions compete, for example 
for funds from the central budget; the constitutional requirement for candidates in 
presidential elections to obtain a territorial distribution of votes (the support of the 
electorate in a considerable number of the given state’s regions), the ful$llment of 
which is necessary to assume the o<ce of president; and supra-regional and inter-
12  On further developments of the consociational theory based on the case of Northern 
Ireland, see Taylor, 2012.
13  #us far, full centripetalism was implemented only in these two countries.
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ethnic political parties required to form ethnically heterogeneous lists of candidates 
in di&erent elections.14
Indonesian Centripetal Institutions 
Most institutions of Indonesian power-sharing are typical of centripetalism. #ese 
are: 1) a territorial structure that “breaks up” large ethnic groups so that they end up 
living in distinct territorial and administrative units (hereafter called a centripetal ter-
ritorial structure); 2) the requirement of a territorial distribution of votes (support) in 
presidential elections, the ful$llment of which is necessary to win presidential o<ce; 
and 3) supra-regional and inter-ethnic political parties. 
"e Centripetal Territorial Structure
#e history of the formation of a centripetal territorial structure in Indonesia goes 
back to the reforms of 1999, as a result of which, despite various federalist projects 
promoted by some politicians and constitutionalists, Indonesia remained a unitary 
(art. 1[1], 18 and 25A of the Constitution of Indonesia, 1945), but decentralized state. 
#e decentralization of a highly centralized state that had been ruled in authoritar-
ian fashion began with the creation of 26 provinces (provinsi, in 2014 there were 34) 
divided into smaller territorial administration districts (kabupaten) and municipal 
areas (kota) (art. 18 of the Constitution). Decentralization was aimed at, among other 
things, a more equitable division of budgetary resources for, as Horowitz (2013, p. 
71) shows, during the authoritarian period “there was great inequality in revenue-
expenditure exchanges between the center and the various regions” of Indonesia. It 
had to do with the fact that regions rich in resources, such as Aceh, Riau (presently the 
provinces of Riau and the Riau Archipelago) and Irian Jaya (presently the provinces 
of Papua and West Papua) de facto subsidized the development of the most populous 
island Java, while they su&ered from under-investment. 
14  #e fourth element of centripetalism is mentioned in the literature – the use of so-called pre-
ferential voting, in the form of either a single transferable vote or an alternative vote, in parliamen-
tary elections (especially to the lower chamber). Such voting, through the ranking of candidates, 
makes it possible for voters to indicate preferences among candidates of di&erent parties. In the case 
of centripetalism, the aim of such voting would be to reduce chances of the election to parliament 
of politicians showing little restraint in their political views and actions, particularly with regard to 
inter-segmental relations. Preferential voting systems functioned for a time in Sri Lanka, Fiji and in 
Papua New Guinea, among other places (Reilly, 2007, pp. 115 – 118; McCulloch, 2013a, 2013b). 
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#e speci$city of Indonesia’s decentralization consisted mainly in the ceding by 
the central authorities of some of its administrative, $scal and political prerogatives,15 
not as much to the provincial level as to the district and municipal area levels within 
individual provinces. #is type of decentralization was supposed to limit the political 
competencies of the provincial authorities to administering a small number of matters 
which continued to lie within the jurisdiction of the central government (such as 
military or religious matters) and to manage in each province those aspects which 
were beyond the jurisdiction of individual districts and municipal areas (like, for 
example, the planning of transportation infrastructure). As Horowitz (2013, p. 73) 
noted, the economic idea behind decentralization was to have as much as 90% of the 
funds transferred from the central authorities to the districts and municipal areas and 
only 10% to the provinces. #e limitation of political power and $nancial resources 
at the provincial level had to do with the fact that in 1999 it was principally at this 
territorial level that “separatist sentiment and demands for autonomy” were to be 
found (Horowitz, 2012, p. 72).
#e centripetal dimension of Indonesia’s territorial structure reforms can be most 
clearly seen in the continuous cutting out of new provinces from those already in 
existence. And so, in 1999, North Maluku was carved out from part of Maluku, in 
2000 Gorontalo from North Sulawesi, in 2003 West Papua from Papua, in 2004 the 
Riau Archipelago from Riau, in 2012 North Kalimantan from East Kalimantan. #e 
creation of an additional 11 basic territorial units by the year 2025 is being discussed 
or has already been decided in the lower chamber of the Indonesian parliament, the 
People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR).
Such units include new provinces mainly set aside from such present provinces 
as Aceh, Papua, West Papua, East Kalimantan and West Kalimantan (Max, 2012). 
#ose are provinces where the potential for separatist currents, demands for wider 
autonomy, or ethnic, religious and communal con*icts continue to exist. Legislators 
do not explicitly point to those factors as being signi$cant for Indonesia’s ongoing 
decentralization. It is di<cult, however, to believe that, for example, the suggested 
creation of a total of $ve new provinces in New Guinea out of the present two of 
Papua and West Papua is coincidental. Many Indonesian politicians have for years 
held the view that the danger represented by the Papuan’s drive for independence 
could be far greater than the separatist currents which exist in the province of Aceh, 
because almost all inhabitants of Aceh are Muslims, as are most Indonesians, whereas 
the Papuans living in Indonesia are mainly Christian (Emmerson, 2000, p. 101).
15  For more on devolved functions to local governments, see Prasetiamartati, 2013.
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Another centripetal dimension of the reform of Indonesia’s territorial structure can 
be seen in the division of Java – Indonesia’s most populous island, inhabited mostly by 
the country’s largest and most in*uential ethnic group, the Javanese – into as many as 
six provinces: Jakarta, Banten, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java.
"e Requirement of Territorial Distribution of Support in Presidential 
Elections 
According to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, (and following the #ird Amend-
ment from 9 November 2001 and the Fourth Amendment from 11 August 2002),16 
the president is elected by universal su&rage (art. 6A [1]) for a $ve-year term (art. 7), 
and is head of state and, at the same time, the head of government (art. 4 [1] and art. 
5). #e same person cannot hold the presidential o<ce more than twice (art. 7). #e 
candidate for president can be proposed by a political party or a coalition of parties 
(art. 6A [2]). To win a presidential election in Indonesia, it is necessary not only to 
obtain 50% of votes from the entire country but, at the same time, at least 20% of 
votes from at least half of its provinces (art. 6A [3] of the Constitution). If no candidate 
manages to secure such support, a second round is held between the two candidates 
who obtained the largest number of votes in the $rst round. #e candidate who wins 
most votes in the second round becomes the head of state (art. 6A [4]). 
#e constitutional requirement for candidates in presidential elections to secure 
a territorial distribution of votes, the meeting of which in the $rst electoral round 
is indispensable to win the o<ce of head of state in Indonesia’s presidential system 
of government, is intended to help select a “pan-ethnic” president (Reilly 2011a, 
p. 292), who could play an “important con*ict-reducing role” (Sisk, 1996, p. 55). 
As Benjamin Reilly (2011a, p. 292) has noted, an excellent example of a centrist 
Indonesian politician with conciliatory skills in inter-segmental relations is Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, a Javanese who had won the presidency twice, in 2004 and 
2009, i.e., at a time when the requirement in question was in force.
#ere has never been a case in Indonesia when a leading candidate has failed to 
win the presidential o<ce in the $rst round for failing to meet the requirement of the 
territorial distribution of votes. #is fact does not indicate that the requirement in 
question is practically immaterial. Quite the opposite, such a state of a&airs leads one 
to conclude that the winners of Indonesia’s presidential elections are politicians whose 
views and actions are restrained, especially in matters that are delicate for inter-ethnic 
16  For more on these Amendments, see Schneier, 2005 and Ellis, 2005.
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relations, and this allows them to win a wider pool of support than the ethnic group 
and religious community they are part of. 
Supra-regional and inter-ethnic political parties 
After the fall of the dictatorship in 1998, Indonesia introduced party pluralism. Most 
signi$cantly in the context of centripetalism, in 1999 Indonesia adopted a require-
ment for political parties to be supra-regional and inter-ethnic in character (Mietzner, 
2008). By the Law of the Republic of Indonesia on General Elections no. 3/1999 (art. 
82) (Horowitz, 2013, p. 69), to be recognized as a political party and be able to par-
ticipate in elections, a political organization initially had to possess regional branches 
in at least one-third of all provinces, and in at least half of all districts and municipal 
areas in each of these provinces. #is requirement was subsequently modi$ed. After 
the 2009 elections, nine country-wide political parties emerged in Indonesia. #eir 
representatives sat in the lower house of parliament and came to an understanding 
in the matter of tightening the centripetal requirements concerning the operation 
of political parties and their participation in elections (IFES, 2014, p. 2). Accord-
ing to the Law of the Republic of Indonesia on the General Election of Members of 
House of Representatives, People’s Representatives Council, and Regional House of 
Representatives no. 8/2012 (art. 8 [2] [b] – d]), in order to operate, a new political 
organization or political party which did not win any parliamentary seats in the 2009 
elections needs to have branches in all Indonesian provinces, in at least 75% of districts 
and municipal areas in each of those provinces, and in 50% of smaller administrative 
units making up the districts and municipal areas. 
#e law presently in force in Indonesia thus requires that political parties be of 
a strictly supra-regional and inter-ethnic nature. In consequence, this prevents the 
functioning of regional, including ethnic, parties. #e exceptions to this centripetal 
rule are the consociational solutions discussed in the further parts of this article and 
allowing for the existence of regional, de facto ethnic, parties in the provinces of Aceh, 
Papua, and West Papua. 
Indonesian Consociational Institutions 
Even though most of the inter-segmental power-sharing institutions in Indonesia are 
centripetal in nature, that state has also adopted a number of consociational solutions. 
#ese are 1) special autonomy for chosen provinces, and 2) segmental (i.e. religious 
and ethnic) parties. #e $rst of these solutions is an emanation of one of the four main 
consociational institutions – autonomy for segments, while the second corresponds 
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directly with the consociational logic of representing group rights and, in consequence, 
the consent for the existence of segmental parties.
Special Autonomy
A speci$c element of Indonesian decentralization has to do with the fact that certain 
provinces (in 2016 there are $ve of them, including two municipalities – the capital 
Jakarta and Yogyakarta, governed by a local sultan) have di&erent powers than the 
rest.17 One can assume that the basis for obtaining a special, i.e., broad autonomy, 
by certain Indonesian provinces is made up of three types of factors: 1) extensive, 
especially in the past, armed separatist currents (such as in the case of the provinces 
of Aceh, Papua and West Papua); 2) considerable respect enjoyed by the traditional 
ruler in the municipality-province of Yogyakarta; and 3) the capital status of the 
municipality-province Jakarta. 
#e special autonomy of Aceh, Papua, and West Papua, giving these provinces 
signi$cant powers unavailable to other provinces, is important from the perspective 
of consociationalism. 
In the case of Aceh, special autonomy under Law No. 11/2006 on the Governing 
of Aceh,18 makes possible above all the functioning of regional parties in this province 
(see the next part of this article) and Sharia Law, and the passing and implementation 
within the scope of this Law of provincial acts of law (art. 16[2], art. 42[1e], Chapters 
17 – 19). It is the only such case at the provincial level in Indonesia. 
#e Law on the Governing of Aceh also provides for other important planes of 
autonomy. And so, in the case of international competencies what is important is 
especially that fact that the provincial parliament, the Aceh House of People’s Rep-
resentatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh, DPRA), has the right to consider and 
consult with the Indonesian central government on drafts of international agreements 
that would a&ect provincial matters within the jurisdiction of the Aceh Government 
(art. 8[1]). #e DPRA also enjoys a similar right in connection with those plans of the 
central government concerning international cooperation that is related in any manner 
with Aceh province (art. 23 [1h]). Similar provisions of the law on autonomy apply 
to internal matters. And so, the DPRA has the right to consider and consult with the 
lower chamber of the Indonesian parliament, the DPR, those provisions that are to 
17  In this respect, it is possible to $nd similarities between Indonesian decentralization and, 
for example, the devolution process in the United Kingdom. 
18  #is law is also called “law on autonomy” in the further parts of this article in reference 
to Aceh.
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a&ect to matters lying within the jurisdiction of the Aceh Government (art. 8[2]). In 
turn, administrative decisions of the central government concerning Aceh are to be 
consulted with the governor of this province, who is elected in direct elections by the 
inhabitants of Aceh (art. 8[3]). #e above-mentioned regulations – as an emanation 
of sorts of the “nothing about us without us” idea – should in practice entail the 
necessity for the central government to secure the consent of the Aceh legislative 
or executive authorities in the said areas. In fact, however, the central Indonesian 
authorities have reserved the right to supervise the “implementation of a&airs” which 
lay in the competence of the Aceh authorities (art. 11[1]).
A signi$cant economic aspect of Aceh’s autonomy is the possibility for this province 
to obtain up to 70% of the revenues that Indonesia earns from the exploitation 
of Achenese oil and natural gas (art. 181 [1b. 5 – 6] and [3], art. 182). #e central 
government nevertheless has the right to co-manage these resources in the province 
along with the Aceh government (art. 160 [1]).
Regarding Acehnese tradition, the law on autonomy allows in turn for the province 
of Aceh to use its own symbols – *ags, coat of arms, and hymn (art. 246 – 248). #is 
law also allows for the functioning in Aceh of certain autochthonous institutions (art. 
98), including above all Wali Nangroe, in whose competence is mainly the supervision 
of the functioning of other traditional institutions, the cultivation of local culture and 
the granting of traditional titles and degrees (art. 96). 
#e provisions of law on the governing of Aceh diverge in some questions, to 
the detriment of the province of Aceh, from those negotiated by the separatists 
of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and the Indonesian 
government, as part of the Helsinki Agreement of 2005, which o<cially put an end 
to the con*ict between the two sides (MoU, 2005). Nevertheless, in Aceh the special 
autonomy has been implemented, in contrast to Papua and West Papua,19 where the 
special autonomy, although formally guaranteed by the Law No. 21/2001 on Special 
Autonomy for the Papua Province, has yet to be implemented and it is not known 
if it will not be de$ned anew in the future. #e present law on special autonomy for 
Papua (and de facto for West Papua) contains many provisions analogous to those in 
the law regulating the special autonomy in Aceh. While they are not discussed in this 
article in consideration of their, for now, mostly theoretical nature,20 it is worthwhile 
to take note of one speci$c provision of the law – one that concerns the allocation of 
19  When the law on Papuan autonomy was being adopted, only one province existed in 
Indonesian New Guinea (Papua, formerly Irian Jaya).
20  For more on this subject, see Trzciński, 2016b.
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extraordinary $nancial resources to raise the low standard of living of the inhabitants 
of Papua and West Papua in relation to that of other Indonesians (point h in the 
Introduction and art. 34 [3d-f ]).21
Segmental Parties
Although basic (in terms of power-sharing) Indonesian regulations concerning the 
functioning of political parties are centripetal in nature (such parties need to be 
supra-regional and inter-ethnic), segmental parties typical of consociationalism are 
also allowed to function. In contrast to Nigeria – a state which, such as Indonesia, 
has mostly centripetal institutions of power-sharing – two types of segmental parties 
may function in Indonesia – religious parties (i.e., parties making direct reference to 
religious values, which constitute the party’s program foundation)22 and ethnic parties 
referred to as regional parties.
Among the religious parties, only the Islamic ones play an important role on the 
political stage,23 because the population of Indonesia is overwhelmingly Muslim. #ere 
are many parties of this type in Indonesia, but four of them are particularly important, 
as their members are deputies in the lower chamber of parliament, the DPR. #ey are 
the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the National Awakening 
Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat 
Nasional, PAN), and the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 
PPP). Following the 2014 elections to the DPR, representatives of those parties occupy 
about 31% of the chamber (173 deputies out of a total of 560 seats, in 2016) (DPR, 
2016). Islamic parties have achieved signi$cant political in*uence since members of 
three such parties (the PKB, PAN, and PPP) became members of the present cabinet 
of President Joko Widodo.
On the other hand, the role of Christian-Democratic parties, or those that reach 
out to Christian values or voters is almost insigni$cant. #is includes the largest 
of them – the Indonesian Democratic Party of Devotion (Partai Kasih Demokrasi 
Indonesia, PKDI) – which manages to gain a measure of support, especially from the 
21  #is aspect of the special autonomy was partially implemented. #ere remain, however, 
serious irregularities in the distribution of special aid resources (Mote, 2016).
22  At $rst glance, religious parties in Indonesia, especially the Islamic ones, may be perceived 
as centripetal in nature since they operate across many ethnic groups and regions. However, they 
are inclusive for the members of one religion while, at the same time, excluding members of others. 
23  For more on the link between the functioning of religious parties and the low quality of 
democracy in Indonesia, see Aspinall, 2010.
Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia 181
Christian inhabitants of Flores or from the Papuans, but has been unable to cross the 
2.5% electoral threshold in elections to the DPR. 
#e functioning of regional parties, which are de facto ethnic parties, is in turn 
legally guaranteed within the framework of special autonomy in the provinces of Aceh, 
Papua, and West Papua. For the time being, ethnic parties function only in Aceh, 
where the autonomy has been implemented. #ese parties operate in the province next 
to the centripetal parties of a supra-regional and inter-ethnic character and compete 
with them in elections. #e ethnic parties in Aceh are only allowed to take part in 
elections to the provincial parliament and the councils of districts and municipal 
areas (art. 1.2 of MoU, 2005; Chapter 11 of Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 
11/2006). Despite the limited territorial reach of the ethnic parties in Aceh, the central 
government’s acquiescence to their existence is a departure from centripetalism’s 
ethnically neutral policy of not supporting groups’ rights. 
In practice, two parties in Aceh are highly signi$cant. #ey are the Aceh Party (Par-
tai Aceh), based on the support of members and sympathizers of GAM and the largest 
in the provincial legislature with 29 representatives out of 100, and the Aceh National 
Party (Partai Nasional Aceh, PNA). In 2012, the inhabitants of Aceh elected the new 
provincial governor, Zaini Abdullah from the Aceh Party, for a $ve-year term by 
a majority of votes. Together, the ethnic parties of Aceh won about 40% of votes in 
the 2014 elections, which means that the majority of the provinces inhabitants voted 
for non-ethnic parties (Gayo, 2014) despite the fact that most of Aceh’s population 
are ethnic Acehnese. 
#e right to establish regional (de facto ethnic) parties is also guaranteed in the Law 
on Special Autonomy for the Papua Province (Chapter 7) and applies presently to the 
two provinces of Papua and West Papua. Given that the special autonomy has not yet 
been fully introduced in those provinces, however, the possibility for autochthonous 
Papuans to establish political parties (art. 28[3]) remains a legal dead letter. 
Conclusion 
Indonesia adopted a hybrid model of power-sharing – one that combines institutional 
arrangements that, in the opinion of many political theoreticians are characteristic 
of two di&erent and theoretically opposite models of inter-segmental power-sharing: 
centripetalism and consociationalism. Although both the theory of centripetalism and 
that of consociationalism are empirical in character because they emerged as a result 
of observations of political realities in multi-segmental countries and are based on an 
in-depth analysis of real examples of power-sharing, the conclusions that follow from 
such analyses are at times of an excessively abstract nature. #e Indonesian example 
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demonstrates that one should not be tightly bound by a set theoretical framework, 
for some institutions of the two power-sharing models need not be mutually exclusive 
in practice, even if the concepts they derive from are contradictory. It is worthwhile 
to remember, that centripetalism tries to overcome di&erences between segments of 
plural society and integrate its members – including and especially the political class 
– above ethnic cleavages. In contrast, the institutions of consociationalism, although 
also working toward building compromises in a plural society, taken together entrench 
segmental, e.g. ethnic or religious divisions. In Indonesia there is no attempt to make 
use of the totality of centripetal and consociational institutions at the same time, 
and the leading centripetal approach is enriched by just a few arrangements of the 
consociational type, namely by territorial autonomy and ethnic parties at the local 
level in Aceh (and, formally constituted but still waiting for full implementation, in 
Papua and West Papua) and religious parties at the central level.
#e example of Indonesia shows, therefore, that certain arrangements which are 
ideologically opposite because they are based on constructivism on the one hand 
and primordialism on the other, can complement each other and serve together to 
stabilize the political situation in a plural society in which such a task is certainly not 
a simple one. 
#e use in Indonesia of a combination of centripetal and consociational arrange-
ments is certainly not a remedy to all ills that exist or arise in Indonesia’s multicultural 
environment, nor can it be. It does not eliminate religious tensions between Muslims 
and Christians, although it certainly contributes to their reduction and to the fact that 
they tend to manifest themselves at a local community level. Indonesian power-sharing 
is also not a remedy for the Islamic extremism present in Indonesia although, of 
course, the phenomenon of extremism in any country can be seen as extra-systemic 
by de$nition.
Although instances of separatism, ethnic, religious and communal con*icts has 
declined in Indonesia since the introduction in that country of power-sharing institu-
tions, it is not possible to ascribe this directly and solely to the application of the 
hybrid type of power-sharing. Many other factors, such as economic growth, the 
development of education, and a growing urbanization rate could just as well have 
contributed to the declining importance of con*ict in relations between segmental 
groups, to the building of inter-segmental accommodation and, by the same token to 
inter-ethnic and inter-religious contacts and interdependencies. Moreover, the rapid 
and often e&ective reaction of the army and police has certainly been a signi$cant 
factor limiting the scale of con*icts, when they occur, between members of various 
ethnic groups and religious communities. 
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It is worthwhile to stress once again that – with the exception of religious parties – 
consociational institutions in Indonesia are present only to a limited degree. #ese were 
designed for selected regions whose a<liation with Indonesia gives rise to reservations 
on the part of the autochthonous political elites. #e statutorily guaranteed solutions 
of a speci$c autonomy and regional (de facto ethnic) political parties in Papua and 
West Papua could very well never be instituted. One may thus presume that their 
introduction was not intended from the very outset (Trzciński, 2016b). #e law on 
special autonomy for the Indonesian portion of New Guinea was adopted at a time 
when pro-independence currents there were strong and autochthonous inhabitants 
outnumbered immigrants from other parts of Indonesia. #is situation has now 
changed diametrically, and Papuans presently represent less than half the population 
of the provinces of Papua and West Papua,24 while their pro-independence activities 
have been paci$ed by the Indonesian army.
In general, consociational institutions in Indonesia can be recognized as com-
plementary to the dominant centripetalism in those areas where centripetal arrange-
ments were not satisfactory for some segments (ethnic or religious), and thus far they 
should be viewed as having a stabilizing e&ect on the Indonesian political system as 
a whole.
References:
Ananta, A., Ari$n, E.N., Hasbullah, M.S., Handayani, N.B., & Pramono, A. (2013). Changing 
Ethnic Composition: Indonesia, 2000 – 2010. Retrieved from: citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/do
wnload?doi=10.1.1.693.2147&rep=rep1&type=pdf
Aspinall, E. (2010). “#e Irony of Success”. Journal of Democracy, 21(2), pp. 20 – 34.
Basedau, M. (2011). “Managing Ethnic Con*ict: #e Menu of Institutional Engineering”. GIGA 
Working Papers, 171, pp. 1 – 29.
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia from 18 August 1945 with later amendments. (1945). 
Retrieved from: www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/id/id061en.pdf
DPR. (2016). Tentang DPR. Retrieved from: www.dpr.go.id/tentang/fraksiz
Ellis, A. (2005). Constitutional Reform in Indonesia: A Retrospective. Retrieved from: www.consti-
tutionnet.org/$les/AEpaperCBPIndonesia.pdf
Elmslie, J. (2010). “West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 Indonesian Census: “Slow 
Motion Genocide” or not?”. CPACS Working Paper, 11(1), pp. 1 – 10.
Emmerson, D.K. (2000). “Will Indonesia Survive?”. Foreign Affairs, 79(3), pp. 95 – 106.
24  #is is due to the state-sponsored policy of transmigration (transmigrasi), i.e., the transfer 
of populations from other, overpopulated regions of Indonesia. For more on this subject, see 
Elmslie, 2010.
Krzysztof Trzciński184
Gayo, L. (2014). Inilah 81 Calon Terpilih Anggota DPRA 2014 – 2019 dari 23 Kabupaten Kota. Re-
trieved from: http://www.lintasgayo.com/48401/inilah-calon-terpilih-anggota-dpra-2014-dari-
23-kabupaten-dan-kota.html.
Horowitz, D.L. (2003). “Electoral Systems and #eir Goals: A Primer for Decision-Makers”. Journal 
of Democracy, 14(4), pp. 115 – 127.
Horowitz, D.L. (2013). Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Horowitz, D.L. (2014). “Ethnic Power Sharing: #ree Big Problems”. Journal of Democracy, 25(2), 
pp. 5 – 20. 
IFES. (2014). Elections in Indonesia: 2014 National Legislative Elections: Frequently Asked Questions. 
Retrieved from: www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/Indone-
sia%202014%20National%20Legislative%20Election%20FAQ.pdf.
Index Mundi. (2015). Indonesia Demographics Profile 2014. Retrieved from: www.indexmundi.
com/indonesia/demographics_pro$le.html.
Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 8/2012 on the General Election of Members of House of 
Representatives, People’s Representatives Council and Regional House of Representatives. 
(2012). Retrieved from: www.anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/IFES-Indonesia-
Uno<cial-Translation-of-Law-82012-on-Legislative-Elections-v1_2012 – 06 – 14.pdf.
Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 11/2006 on the Governing of Aceh. (2006). Retrieved from: 
pih.kemlu.go.id/$les/UU%2011-%202006.pdf.
Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for the Papua Province. 
(2001). Retrieved from: papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/$les/otsus-en.html.
Lijphart, A. (1980). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Lijphart, A. (1995). “Multiethnic Democracy”. In S.M. Lipset (Ed.), #e Encyclopedia of Democracy, 
3, (pp. 853 – 865). London: Routledge.
Lijphart, A. (2008). #inking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in #eory and 
Practice. London: Routledge.
Macdonald, G. (2013). Election Rules and Identity Politics: Understanding the Success of Multi-ethnic 
Parties in Indonesia. Retrieved from: www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20
PaperReport/2013/2012_Hybl_Fellowship_Final.pdf.
Max, S.R. (2012). How Many Provinces Does Indonesia Need? Retrieved from: www.thejakartapost.
com/news/2012/04/20/how-many-provinces-does-indonesia-need.html.
McCulloch, A. (2013a). “Does Moderation Pay? Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Societies”. 
Ethnopolitics, 12(2), pp. 111 – 132.
McCulloch, A. (2013b). “#e Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places”. In J. McE-
voy & B. O’Leary (Eds.), Power-Sharing in Deeply Divided Places, (pp. 94 – 111). Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press.
McGibbon, R. (2004). Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? 
Washington DC: East-West Center Washington.
Mietzner, M. (2008). “Comparing Indonesia’s Party Systems of the 1950s and the Post-Suharto 
Era: From Centrifugal to Centripetal Inter-Party Competition”. Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 39/3, pp. 431 – 453.
MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement signed 
Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia 185
in Helsinki on the 15 of August 2005. (2005). Retrieved from: www.ucdp.uu.se/downloads/
fullpeace/Ind%20050815.pdf.
Mote, O. (2016) Special Autonomy Issue. Retrieved from: www.etan.org/issues/wpapua/1207spaut.
htm.
Prasetiamartati, B. (2013). Policy and Participatory Local Governance in Indonesia. Retrieved from: 
www.pk.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/Democratic%20Governance/Federalism/Inter-
national%20Conference%20Sept13/presentations/Day2/3rd%20Ms.%20Budiati%20pdf.pdf
Reilly, B. (2007). Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Reilly, B. (2011a). Centripetalism. In K. Cordell & S. Wol& (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethnic 
Conflict (pp. 288 – 299). London: Routledge.
Reilly, B. (2011b). “Centripetalism: Cooperation, Accommodation, and Integration”. In S. Wol& 
& Ch. Yakinthou (Eds.), Conflict Management in Divided Societies: #eories and Practice 
(pp. 57 – 64). New York: Routledge.
Schneier, E. (2005). #e Role of Constitution-building Processes in Democratization: Case Study – 
Indonesia: #e Constitution-building Process in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Retrieved from: www.
idea.int/cbp/upload/CBP_indonesia.pdf
Shapiro, I. (2006). Stan teorii demokracji (#e State of Democratic #eory). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe PWN. 
Sisk, T.D. (1996). Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace.
Taylor, R. (2009). Consociational #eory: McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict. 
London: Routledge.
Trzciński, K. (2016a). “How #eoretically Opposite Models of Interethnic Power-Sharing Can 
Complement Each Other and Contribute to Political Stabilization: #e Case of Nigeria”. 
Politeja, 42(3), pp. 53 – 73.
Trzciński, K. (2016b). “#e Consociational Addition to Indonesia’s Centripetalism as a Tactic of 
the Central Authorities: #e Case of Papua”. Hemispheres, 31(4), pp. 5 – 20.
Wilford, R. (2003). “Power-Sharing”. In I. McLean & A. McMillan (Eds.), #e Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of Politics, (pp. 434 – 444). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wol&, S. (2010). “Consociationalism, Power Sharing, and Politics at the Center”. In R.A. Den-
emark (Ed.), #e International Studies Encyclopedia. Volume Two (pp. 535 – 556). Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell.
Wol&, S. (2012). “Complex Power Sharing”. In G.K. Brown & A. Langer (Eds.), Elgar Handbook 
of Civil War and Fragile States (pp. 457 – 477). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
World Bank (2016). Indonesia. Retrieved from: www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia.
Worldometers (2016). Indonesia Population. Retrieved from: www.worldometers.info/world-
population/indonesia-population.
Author
Professor Dr Hab. Krzysztof Trzciński 
Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures. Contact details: 
ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00 – 330 Warszawa, Poland; e-mail: ktrzcinski@iksio.pan.pl
